REPRINTING OF HOUSE
REPORT NO. 2505
82ND CONGRESS
CONCERNING
THE KATYN FOREST
MASSACRE

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1988
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THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

FINAL REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF THE FACTS,
EVIDENCE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE
KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 390

AND

H. Res. 539

(82d Congress)

A RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE MASS MURDER OF POLISH OFFICERS IN THE
KATYN FOREST NEAR SMOLENSK, RUSSIA

DECEMBER 22, 1952.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1952
SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
THE FACTS, EVIDENCE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KATYN FOREST
MASSACRE

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JOHN J. MITCHELL, Chief Counsel

ROMAN C. PUCINSKI, Chief Investigator

LUCILE S. BERGENHAUSER, Secretary
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The members of this committee join in expressing their deep appreciation to Mr. John J. Mitchell, chief counsel; Mr. Roman C. Pucinski, chief investigator; and Lucile S. Biebighauser, secretary. The vast amount of documentation and evidence compiled by this committee is a tribute to the diligence and effectiveness of their work in this unprecedented investigation.

The committee wishes to express their appreciation for the assistance and cooperation during the entire course of this investigation to the following people:

Mr. Ben Hill Brown, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Mr. Francis Shackelford, formerly counselor for the Department of the Army, now Assistant Secretary of the Army.

Mr. B. A. Monaghan, presently counselor for the Department of the Army.

Mr. Jerome P. Facher, a member of the Department of the Army counselors’ staff.

The members of the staff of the American Embassies at London and Paris, as well as the office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, contributed greatly to the success of the hearings this committee conducted in Europe during April 1952.

It would be impossible for this committee to express their gratitude personally to all individuals and organizations who have contributed materially to this investigation of the Katyn Forest massacre.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

DECEMBER 22, 1952.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. MADDEN, from the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, submitted the following

FINAL REPORT

[Pursuant to H. Res. 390 and H. Res. 539, 82d Cong.]

INTRODUCTION

On September 18, 1951, the House of Representatives unanimously adopted House Resolution 390. This resolution provided for the establishment of a select committee to conduct a full and complete investigation concerning the Katyn massacre, an international crime committed against soldiers and citizens of Poland at the beginning of World War II.

The Katyn massacre involved some 4,243 of the 15,400 Polish Army officers and intellectual leaders who were captured by the Soviets when Russia invaded Poland in September 1939. These officers were interned in three Soviet prison camps in the territory of the U.S.S.R. They were permitted to correspond with their families in Poland until May 10, 1940. Then all trace of these men was lost after that date. Nothing further of their whereabouts was known until several mass graves containing remains of Polish bodies were discovered in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, U.S.S.R., by the German troops in April of 1943.

The Katyn massacre was one of the most barbarous international crimes in world history. Since the discovery of the graves, and until this committee completed its investigation, the massacre remained an international mystery. The Soviets blamed the Germans for the crime. They charged the Poles fell into Nazi hands when Germany invaded Russia in the summer of 1941. The Germans organized a medical commission investigation consisting of leading doctors
from 12 European nations including the neutral country of Switzerland. This medical commission met at Katyn on April 29 and 30, 1943, and unanimously determined that the Poles were massacred in the spring of 1940. At that time the Katyn area was under the complete domination of the Soviets.

COMMITTEE APPOINTED

Immediately following passage of House Resolution 390, the Speaker of the House of Representatives appointed the following members of this committee: Ray J. Madden, Democrat, Indiana, chairman; Daniel J. Flood, Democrat, Pennsylvania; Foster Furcolo, Democrat, Massachusetts; Thaddeus M. Machrowicz, Democrat, Michigan; George A. Dondoro, Republican, Michigan; Alvin E. O'Konski, Republican, Wisconsin; and Timothy P. Sheehan, Republican, Illinois.

The committee selected John J. Mitchell as chief counsel and Roman C. Pucinski as chief investigator.

PROCEDURE

The committee's investigation was divided into two phases: First, to establish which nation actually was guilty of the massacre; and, second, to establish whether any American officials were responsible for suppressing the facts of the massacre with all of its ramifications from the American people.

INTERIM REPORT

On July 2, 1952, this committee filed with the House of Representatives an interim report (H. Rept. 2430) in which it fixed the guilt for the Katyn massacre on the Soviet NKVD Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. On the basis of voluminous testimony, including that of recognized medical expert witnesses, and other data assembled by our staff, this committee concluded there does not exist a scintilla of proof, or even any remote circumstantial evidence, that this mass murder took place no later than the spring of 1940. The Poles were then prisoners of the Soviets and the Katyn Forest area was still under Soviet occupation.

In the interim report this committee recommended the Soviets be tried before the International World Court of Justice for committing a crime at Katyn which was in violation of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. The United Nations Charter presently carries provisions for the legal action recommended by this committee.

Furthermore, this committee called attention to the striking similarity between the Katyn massacre and events taking place in Korea today. For 2 years the Soviets disavowed any knowledge of the vanished Polish officers and deceived the Polish Government in its search for these men. Today the Communists are similarly prolonging the Korean peace talks because they cannot account for the 8,000 American soldiers reported by General Ridgway "killed as war crimes victims." There are many indications that Katyn was a blueprint for Korea.
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

The International Committee of the Red Cross, in April 1943, requested Soviet permission to conduct a neutral investigation at Katyn and their request was ignored by Moscow. In March 1951, the International Committee of the Red Cross sent two delegates to Peiping, China, to request permission to conduct a neutral investigation of alleged war atrocities in Korea. In July 1951 Communist Red China refused permission to conduct such an investigation.

Excerpts of our interim report appear in the appendix. This final report will deal primarily with the second phase of our investigation.

SECOND PHASE

The Congress requested that our committee determine why certain reports and files concerning the Katyn massacre disappeared or were suppressed by departments of our Government.

Records and documents assembled from the State Department and War Department files provided a clear-cut picture of the tremendously important part the Katyn massacre played in shaping the future of postwar Europe.

From these hitherto secret documents this committee learned that as early as the summer of 1942 American authorities considered a Polish Army extremely vital to the Allied war effort against Hitler and Mussolini. Documents introduced in our hearings describe conclusively the efforts made to create such an army on Russian soil as quickly as possible. We learned further that American authorities knew as early as 1942 of Poland’s desperate efforts to locate her missing officers who could lead the Polish Army being formed on Russian soil.

These same documents show that when high-level Polish officials failed to obtain an adequate reply from the Soviets regarding the whereabouts of their missing officers, American emissaries intervened. In every instance, American officials were given the same reply: The Soviets had no knowledge of their whereabouts.

United States Ambassador to Moscow, Admiral William H. Standley, advised the State Department of September 10, 1942 that Soviet officials were opposed to United States intervention in Russo-Polish problems. This attitude was stated to Admiral Standley by Molotov when Standley inquired about the missing Polish officers.

Throughout 1942-43—or until the mass graves were discovered at Katyn—this committee’s record recites a long series of efforts being made by the United States to aid the Poles. But it also shows the total lack of cooperation the United States received from the Soviets.

When Russia finally broke diplomatic relations with Poland (April 26, 1943) following the Polish request for an International Red Cross investigation of the Katyn massacre, Ambassador Standley warned the State Department that Russia had been seeking a pretext to break with Poland for some time. He emphasized that the Soviets were plotting to create a pro-Communist satellite Polish government which would take over Poland after the war. He warned that Russia was planning to create an entire belt of pro-
Soviet governments in eastern Europe, which would jeopardize the peace of Europe.

It is apparent that American authorities knew of the growing tension between the Soviets and the Poles during 1942-43—and they likewise knew about the hopeless search for the Polish officers—but at the time, all of these factors were brushed aside, on the theory that pressing the search would irritate Soviet Russia and thus hinder the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion.

**TOP UNITED STATES OFFICIALS TESTIFY**

The Katyn investigation revealed that many individuals throughout the State Department, Army Intelligence (G-2), Office of War Information and Federal Communications Commission, and other Government agencies, failed to properly evaluate the material being received from our sources overseas. In many instances, this information was deliberately withheld from public attention and knowledge. There was a definite lack of coordination on intelligence matters between Army Intelligence (G-2) and the State Department, at least as far as the missing Polish officers and the Katyn massacre was concerned.

The possibility exists that many second-echelon personnel, who were overly sympathetic to the Russian cause or pro-Communist-minded, attempted to cover up derogatory reports which were received concerning the Soviets.

Former American Ambassador Averell Harriman—now Mutual Security Director—and former Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, explained why the United States acquiesced so frequently to outrageous Soviet demands.

Both said the underlying consideration throughout the war was military necessity. They agreed that American foreign policy called for a free postwar Poland to assure stability in Europe. Both concurred in the fact that the United States wanted a Polish Army very urgently in the Near East campaign. They insisted, however, that these considerations had to give way to military necessity and to the maintenance of our alliance with Russia. These witnesses further maintained the Allies feared Russia might make a separate peace with the Germans.

American emissaries who reported the status of conditions concerning the Soviets were either bypassed or disregarded if their views were critical of the Soviets. When some of the emissaries expressed anti-Soviet observations, President Roosevelt sent his personal representative to confer directly with Marshal Stalin.

This was borne out by testimony of Ambassador Standley, who said that when he warned against Russia’s postwar plans for forming a pro-Soviet bloc of nations around the U.S.S.R., President Roosevelt sent Wendell Willkie to confer with Stalin. Mr. Standley said he was not given the details of Mr. Willkie’s mission.

In retrospect, we now realize the prophetic truth of Admiral Standley’s warning about the Soviets which he made in 1943, when the Katyn massacre was announced to the world for the first time. (See vol. VII of the published hearings.)

Both Mr. Harriman and Mr. Welles, in testifying before our committee, conceded in effect that the United States officials had taken
a gamble of Russia’s pledge to work harmoniously with the western democracies after the war—and lost.

However, they presented arguments to justify their actions. Mr. Harriman insisted that agreements made at Tehran and Yalta would have assured a lasting peace if only the Soviets had kept their promises.

Mr. Harriman insisted that territorial concessions made to the Soviets at the Big Three conferences were predicated on the military reality that the Soviets were actually in physical control of these lands. To have resisted their demands, or to have tried to drive the Soviets out by force, would have meant prolonging the war, Mr. Harriman maintained.

He further testified that concessions made to the Soviets at Yalta were made at a time when the American Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted on getting the Soviets into the Japanese war at all costs.

Mr. Harriman said he personally “was full of distrust of the Soviets at the time.” He declared the Yalta agreements were breached by the Soviets. He stated that the present government in Poland is not representative of its people. He added, “It is a puppet government of the Soviet Union.”

Mr. Harriman testified:

The fact that they [the Soviets] broke these agreements has been one of the reasons why the Free World has become more and more united. (See vol. VII of the published hearings.)

This committee believes the tragic concessions at Yalta might not have taken place if the Polish officer corps had not been annihilated by the Soviets at Katyn. With proper leadership, the Polish Army could have relieved a great deal of the early reverses suffered by the Allies. The Kremlin’s hand would not have been as strong at the Yalta Conference, and many of the concessions made because of “military necessity”, as maintained by Mr. Harriman, would have been obviated.

This contention is borne out by a portion of a telegram sent to the State Department on June 2, 1942, by A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., American Ambassador assigned to the Polish Government in Exile in London. (See exhibit 21, pt. VII of the published hearings.)

The absence of these officers is the principal reason for the shortage of officers in the Polish forces in Russia, wither officers from Scotland had to be sent lately. The possible death of these men, most of whom have superior education, would be a severe blow to the Polish national life.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT INTERCEDES

This committee heard testimony and studied documents which clearly show President Roosevelt himself appeared concerned about Polish-Soviet relations. When Marshal Stalin informed the President of his decision to break off diplomatic relations with the Poles following their demand for an International Red Cross investigation of Katyn, Mr. Roosevelt sent a personal message urging Stalin to reconsider his action.
The tone of Mr. Roosevelt’s message clearly demonstrated his desire, above all, to retain cordial relations with the Soviets. (See exhibit 17, pt. VII of the published hearings.)

When again, in 1944, former Ambassador George Howard Earle, who served as a special emissary for President Roosevelt in the Balkans, tried to convince Mr. Roosevelt that the Soviets were guilty of the Katyn massacre, the President dismissed the suggestion.

Testifying before this committee that he based his statement to the President on secret documents and photographs of Katyn clearly establishing Soviet guilt, Mr. Earle quoted the President as replying:

George, this is entirely German propaganda and a German plot. I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this.

It becomes apparent to this committee that the President and the State Department ignored numerous documents from Ambassador Stanley, Ambassador Biddle, and Ambassador Winant, American emissary to London, who reported information which strongly pointed to Soviet perfidy.

It becomes obvious Mr. Roosevelt’s dealings with the Soviets throughout the war were based on a strong desire for mutual cooperation with Russia in the war effort. This desire was based on a belief in Soviet Russia’s sincerity. It is equally obvious that this desire completely overshadowed the dictates of justice and equity to our loyal but weaker ally, Poland.

CONCLUSIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

When Sumner Welles was asked by a member of this committee if a more firm attitude toward the Soviets during the war would have helped avoid some of today’s postwar problems, Mr. Welles replied:

It is a very difficult thing to answer in the light of hindsight. As I look at it today, I think you are entirely correct. As we looked at it then, of course, the success of the war effort was the major effort; and I must remind the committee that the one overshadowing fear on the part of our military authorities at that time was a separate peace on the part of the Soviet Government with Germany.

It appears from the record that the Katyn massacre undermined Polish-Soviet relations throughout the war and thereafter. Katyn was a means to an end. The Soviets had plotted to take over Poland as early as 1939. Their massacre of these Polish officers was designed to eliminate the intellectual leadership which subsequently would have attempted to block Russia’s ultimate designs for complete communization of Poland. This was but a step of the Soviets toward the complete communization of Europe and eventually the entire world, including the United States.

The record of this committee shows that the United States had been forewarned of Soviet Russia’s treacherous designs on Poland and the rest of Europe. Whatever the justification may be, this committee is convinced the United States in its relations with the
Soviets found itself in the tragic position of winning the war but losing the peace.

THE VAN VLIET REPORT

On May 22, 1945, an American Infantry officer, Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., arrived in Washington from Europe and promptly reported to Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, Army Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Army Intelligence (G-2), to record his observations at Katyn. Colonel Van Vliet and Captain Donald Stewart, while German prisoners of war, had been taken to the mass burial grounds by the Nazis in May 1943. It was apparent the Nazis had hoped to bolster credence in their charges by taking Colonel Van Vliet and Captain Stewart, as well as British officers, to the scene of the graves. Neither Colonel Van Vliet nor Capt. Donald Stewart would commit themselves to any conclusion while in Nazi detention. But as soon as Colonel Van Vliet was liberated he came to the Pentagon to make his report.

In his report, dictated on General Bissell’s orders, Colonel Van Vliet described his observations and concluded, emphatically and unequivocally, that he was convinced the Polish officers were murdered by the Soviets.

General Bissell promptly labeled the report “Top secret.” This report was made in a single original manuscript without copies. General Bissell ordered Colonel Van Vliet to maintain absolute secrecy concerning his report.

This “Top secret” document has disappeared from the Army Intelligence (G-2) files, and to this date has not been found. The search for the Van Vliet report has been one of the most important tasks of this committee. An independent investigation conducted by the Army’s Inspector General in 1950 concluded the report had been “compromised” and that there is nothing to indicate it had ever left Army Intelligence (G-2). This finding was in response to General Bissell’s allegation that he “believes” he had forwarded Van Vliet’s report to the Department of State.

Appearing before this committee on two different occasions, General Bissell steadfastly maintained his belief that he had forwarded the document to the Department of State on May 25, 1945.

GENERAL BISSELL TESTIFIES

General Bissell introduced into evidence a letter he had written to Assistant Secretary of State Julius Holmes on that date, inquiring if the State Department had any record of another Van Vliet document and interrogation by a Swiss Protecting Power official shortly after Colonel Van Vliet had visited Katyn. Bissell’s letter of May 25 bears no notation that an enclosure was attached. Nor is there any record of a receipt for the “Top secret” report to prove the document actually was received by the Department of State. (See exhibit 5, pt. VII of the published hearings.)

General Bissell introduced into evidence another letter he had written on August 21, 1945, to Mr. Frederick B. Lyon, Mr. Holmes' assistant in the Department of State. In this letter General Bissell includes a report by a British officer who likewise was taken to
Katyn by the Nazis. General Bissell concludes his letter of August 21 with the statement:

This report substantiates in effect the statement of Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., forwarded to General Holmes on the 25th day of May 1945.

In his testimony before this committee General Bissell contended that the particular phrase in his letter of August 21 substantiates his claim that he sent the Van Vliet report to the State Department.

Both Mr. Holmes, who is now Minister of the American Embassy in London, and Mr. Lyon testified before the committee. Under oath, they disavowed any knowledge of ever having received the Van Vliet report from General Bissell. They also stated that if they had discussed this report with General Bissell they would have remembered it because of the “political significance” involved at that time.

It is this committee’s conclusion that General Bissell is mistaken in his claim that he might have forwarded the Van Vliet report to the State Department. The committee believes the Van Vliet report was either removed or purposely destroyed in Army Intelligence (G-2).

General Bissell himself admitted to the committee that had the Van Vliet report been publicized in 1945, when agreements for creating a United Nations organization reached at Yalta were being carried out in San Francisco, Soviet Russia might never have taken a seat in this international organization.

In justifying his actions for designating the Van Vliet report “Top secret,” General Bissell said he was merely carrying out the spirit of the Yalta agreement.

He admitted the report was explosive and came at a time when the United States was still trying to get a commitment from the Soviets to enter the Japanese war. General Bissell contradicted his own theory when he told the committee that the Van Vliet report couldn’t have been sent to the Secretary of the Army “because it had nothing to do with the prosecution of the war at that time.”

This committee was dismayed to learn that the United States Assistant Chief of Staff, Army Intelligence (G-2), was considering political significance of the Van Vliet document, which should have been treated objectively from a strictly Military Intelligence standpoint.

In the opinion of this committee, it was the duty and obligation of General Bissell to process this document with care so that it would have reached the Department of State.

General Bissell testified:

I saw in it [the Van Vliet report] great possibilities of embarrassment; so I classified it the way I have told you, and I think I had no alternative.

More amazing to this committee is testimony of three high-ranking American Army officers who were stationed in Army Intelligence (G-2) during General Bissell’s command of this agency. Testifying in executive session, all three agreed there was a pool of “pro-Soviet civilian employees and some military in Army Intelli-
gence (G–2), who found explanations for almost everything that the Soviet Union did.”

These same witnesses told of tremendous efforts exerted by this group to suppress anti-Soviet reports. The committee likewise heard testimony that top-ranking Army officers who were too critical of the Soviets were bypassed in Army Intelligence (G–2).

There is no question that Army Intelligence (G–2) knew of the military potential of the Polish Army which was being formed in Russia in 1941. In March 1942, an American Army officer, Col. Henry I. Szymanski, was sent to join that army as a United States liaison officer. Colonel Szymanski told this committee he never did carry out his mission in Russia because the Soviets refused him a visa. Szymanski was recalled in November 1942 to give a full account of Soviet obstruction to the creation of the much-needed Polish Army. Evidence unearthed by this committee shows that Szymanski’s highly critical reports of Soviet Russia were buried in the basement of Army Intelligence (G–2), and subsequently moved to the “dead file” of that agency.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

When the Nazis, on April 13, 1943, announced to the world the finding of the mass graves of the Polish officers at Katyn and accused the Soviets, the Allies were stunned by this action and called it propaganda. Mr. Elmer Davis, news commentator, then head of the Office of War Information, an agency established by Executive order, told this committee he reported direct to the President. Under questioning he admitted frequent conferences with the State Department and other Government agencies. However, testifying before this committee, when faced with his own broadcast of May 3, 1943, in which he accused the Nazis of using the Katyn massacre as propaganda, he admitted under questioning that this broadcast was made on his own initiative.

This is another example of the failure to coordinate between Government agencies. A State Department memorandum dated April 22, 1943, which was read into the record (see Vol. VII of the published hearings), stated:

and on the basis of the various conflicting contentions [concerning Katyn] of all parties concerned, it would appear to be advisable to refrain from taking any definite stand in regard to this question.

Mr. Davis, therefore, bears the responsibility for accepting the Soviet propaganda version of the Katyn massacre without full investigation. A very simple check with either Army Intelligence (G–2) or the State Department would have revealed that the Katyn massacre issue was extremely controversial.

Furthermore, members of the staff of both OWI and FCC did engage in activities beyond the scope of their responsibilities. This unusual activity of silencing radio commentators first came to light in August 1943 when the House committee investigating the National Communications Commission discovered the procedure.

The technique utilized by staff members of OWI and FCC to silence was as follows: Polish radio commentators in Detroit and Buffalo broadcasting in foreign languages after the announcement of
the discovery of the mass graves of Polish officers at Katyn reported facts indicating that the Soviets might be guilty of this massacre.

In May 1943 a member of the FCC staff suggested to a member of the OWI staff that the only way to prevent these comments was to contact the Wartime Foreign Language Radio Control Committee. This committee was made up of station owners and managers who were endeavoring to cooperate with the OWI and FCC during the war years. Accordingly a meeting was arranged in New York with two of the members of this industry committee. They were specifically requested by the OWI staff member to arrange to have a Polish radio commentator in Detroit restrict his comments to straight news items concerning Katyn, and only those by the standard wire services. The fact that a member of the FCC staff attended this meeting is significant because the FCC in such a case had no jurisdiction. In fact, the FCC member was in New York to discuss the renewal of the radio license of one of these industry members. The owner of the radio station in Detroit was contacted and requested to restrict the comments of the Polish commentator on his station, and this was done.

By applying indirect pressure on the station owner, these staff members accomplished their purpose, namely, keeping the full facts of the Katyn massacre story from the American people. (See vol. VII of the published hearings.)

Office of Censorship officials testified and supported the conclusion of this committee that the OWI and FCC officials acted beyond the scope of their official Government responsibilities on this matter of Katyn.

Testimony before this committee likewise proves that the Voice of America—successor to the Office of War Information—had failed to fully utilize available information concerning the Katyn massacre until the creation of this committee in 1951. The committee was not impressed with statements that publication of facts concerning this crime, prior to 1951, would lead to an ill-fated uprising in Poland. Neither was it convinced by the statements of OWI officials that for the Polish-Americans to hear or read about the Katyn massacre in 1943 would have resulted in a lessening of their cooperation in the Allied war effort.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON

Mr. Justice Jackson appeared before this committee and advised that he had received no instructions or information concerning the Katyn massacre. When asked to explain how the Katyn affair happened to come on the agenda of the Nuremberg trials under the indictment of Herman Goering, he stated that the Soviets were responsible for drawing indictments on war crimes committed in eastern Europe. Mr. Justice Jackson stated as follows:

    To the United States was allocated the over-all conspiracy to incite and wage a war of aggression. The British were assigned the violation of specific treaties and crimes on the high seas. Violations of the laws of war and crimes against humanity were divided on a geographical basis. The French undertook crimes in western Europe, and the
Soviet prosecution was assigned the duty of preparing and presenting evidence of crimes in eastern Europe—an area largely in Soviet occupation, and to much of which the others of us had no access. The geographical area thus assigned to the Soviet representatives included Katyn wood and Poland as well, but at that time it was not known that the Katyn massacre would be involved.

When asked by the committee if he had received the various reports then in the files of the State Department and Army Intelligence (G-2), Mr. Justice Jackson testified that he had not. When asked by the committee what he would have done if he had received these reports, he replied as follows:

Of course, any information would have been helpful. If we had had information of that kind, I cannot pass on whether this would have been adequate, but if we had had adequate information of Russian guilt, we would not have consented at all to have the charge against the Nazis. It would have strengthened our hand in keeping it out immensely and probably would have resulted in the Soviets not making the accusation.

Before this committee was formed, many allegations were made that Americans on Mr. Jackson’s staff at Nuremberg assisted the Soviets in the preparation of this case on Katyn against the Nazis. The committee desired to clarify this point and specifically asked Mr. Jackson this question, and he denied that any member of his staff participated in the preparation of the Katyn indictment.

The committee viewed with interest Mr. Justice Jackson’s statement in his testimony which is as follows:

This history will show that, if it is now deemed possible to establish responsibility for the Katyn murders, nothing that was decided by the Nuremberg Tribunal or contended for by the American prosecution will stand in your way.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In submitting this final report to the House of Representatives, this committee has come to the conclusion that in those fateful days nearing the end of the Second World War there unfortunately existed in high governmental and military circles a strange psychosis that military necessity required the sacrifice of loyal allies and our own principles in order to keep Soviet Russia from making a separate peace with the Nazis.

For reasons less clear to this committee, this psychosis continued even after the conclusion of the war. Most of the witnesses testified that had they known then what they now know about Soviet Russia, they probably would not have pursued the course they did. It is undoubtedly true that hindsight is much easier to follow than foresight, but it is equally true that much of the material which this committee unearthed was or could have been available to those responsible for our foreign policy as early as 1942.

And, it is equally true that even before 1942 the Kremlin rulers gave much evidence of a menace of Soviet imperialism paving the way for world conquest. Through the disastrous failure to recognize
the danger signs which then existed and in following a policy of satisfying the Kremlin leaders, our Government unwittingly strengthened their hand and contributed to a situation which has grown to be a menace to the United States and the entire free world.

2. Our committee is sending a copy of this report, and volume 7 of the published hearings, to the Department of Defense for such action as may be proper with regard to General Bissell. We do so because of the fact that this committee believes that had the Van Vliet report been made immediately available to the Department of State and to the American public, the course of our governmental policy toward Soviet Russia might have been more realistic with more fortunate postwar results.

3. This committee believes that the wartime policies of Army Intelligence (G–2) during 1944–45 should undergo a thorough investigation. Testimony heard by the committee substantiates this belief, and if such an investigation is conducted another object lesson might be learned.

4. Our committee concludes that the staff members of the Office of War Information and Federal Communications Commission who participated in the program of silencing Polish radio commentators went beyond the scope of their duties as official Government representatives. Actually, they usurped the functions of the Office of Censorship and by indirect pressure accomplished domestic censorship which was not within the jurisdiction of either of these agencies.

5. This committee believes that if the Voice of America is to justify its existence it must utilize material made available more forcefully and effectively.

6. This committee began its investigation last year, and as the committee's work progressed, information, documents, and evidence was submitted from all parts of the world. It was at this same time that reports reached the committee of similar atrocities and violations of international law being perpetrated in Korea. This committee noted the striking similarity between crimes committed against the Poles at Katyn and those being inflicted on American and other United Nations troops in Korea. Communist tactics being used in Korea are identical to those followed at Katyn. Thus this committee believes that Congress should undertake an immediate investigation of the Korean war atrocities in order that the evidence can be collected and the truth revealed to the American people and the free peoples of the world. This committee will return to Congress approximately $21,000 in surplus funds, and it is suggested that this money be made available by Congress for such an investigation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The final report of the Select Committee Investigating the Katyn Forest Massacre hereby incorporates the recommendations contained in the interim report, filed on July 2, 1952 (II. Rept. No. 2480).
This committee unanimously recommends that the House of Representatives approve the committee's findings and adopt a resolution:

1. Requesting the President of the United States to forward the testimony, evidence, and findings of this committee to the United States delegates at the United Nations;

2. Requesting further that the President of the United States issue instructions to the United States delegates to present the Katyn case to the General Assembly of the United Nations;

3. Requesting that appropriate steps be taken by the General Assembly to seek action before the International World Court of Justice against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for committing a crime at Katyn which was in violation of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

4. Requesting the President of the United States to instruct the United States delegation to seek the establishment of an international commission which would investigate other mass murders and crimes against humanity.

Ray J. Madden, Chairman.
Daniel J. Flood.
Thaddeus M. Machrowicz.
George A. Dondero.
Alvin E. O'Konski.
Timothy P. Sheehan.
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT BY MR. SHEEIHAN

On November 22d I addressed a letter to the Honorable Ray J. Madden, chairman of our committee, listing my conclusions for the consideration of the Katyn Committee to be incorporated in the final report.

Most of these conclusions have been incorporated in the final report and I am happy to join with my colleagues in making this a unanimous report. However, it seems to me that there is need for further emphasis on several points covered in the report and I feel these points can be best emphasized by this addendum to the final report.

MISJUDGMENT OF RUSSIA

On page 3 of this final report the opening sentence under the heading "Second phase" read:

The Congress requested that our committee determine why certain reports and files concerning the Katyn massacre disappeared or were suppressed by departments of our Government.

From the disclosure of many hitherto secret documents and from the oral testimony of men like our former Ambassadors Standley and Harriman, Special Ambassador George Earle, the former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and others, the cover-up of the facts of the Katyn massacre and withholding them from the American people was but a part of the desire on the part of the Democrat administration to cover their basic and colossal error in their foreign policy judgment.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who Mr. Harriman stated set our foreign policy and was the final authority on all foreign policy decisions, thought that Russia would disintegrate immediately after the end of the war. When warned by various of his appointees that Russia would become a great menace, Mr. Roosevelt silenced these men and refused to heed their advice. Mr. Roosevelt kept committing our country to agreements with the Russians in spite of the fact, as Mr. Harriman stated, that—

* * * There were a series of misdeeds by the Russians, from our standpoint, beginning with the Ribbentrop treaty, that it (revelation of the Katyn massacre) would have contributed, I think, to further distrust of the Soviets.

Roosevelt's misjudgment that Russia would honor her agreements, in spite of the factual record of her past broken promises, has proven to be the major error in our entire foreign policy. In setting this policy, our Government, through the State Department, the Army Intelligence (G-2), the Office of War Information,
and the Voice of America, followed the policy line so that the American people were misled. During the war the American public was led to believe that Russia was a loyal and trustworthy ally and after the war and until very recently, the executive department covered up the fact that they were so grossly mistaken about Russia.

To me, the reason why our Government suppressed the truth about the Katyn massacre was because this was but a small part of the giant error made in our foreign policy program. If our Government would have disclosed the truth about Katyn and the sellout of Poland, it would have had to disclose more truths about the perfidy of Russia. The American people would have then spoken in no uncertain terms and the Democrat administration did not want that to happen for very obvious reasons.

PROPAGANDA AGENCIES

Admittedly, during the Katyn investigation, we but scratched the surface on the part that the Office of War Information and the Voice of America took in following the administration line in suppressing the facts about the Katyn massacre. During the war there may have been a reasonable excuse for not broadcasting facts which were available in our State Department and Army Intelligence about the Katyn massacre and other facts which proved Russia’s failure to live up to her agreements. After the war there certainly was no excuse for not using in our propaganda war the truths which were in the files of our various Government departments.

One of the witnesses from the Department of State, which controls the policy of the Voice of America, stated that they did not broadcast the fact of Katyn behind the iron curtain was because they did not have sufficient facts on it. Yet the preponderance of evidence presented to our committee about the cover-up came from the files of the State Department itself.

The Voice of America, in its limited broadcasts about the Katyn massacre, followed a washy-washy, spineless policy. From other information revealed about the policies followed by the Voice of America, a committee of the Congress ought to make a thorough investigation and see to it that the Voice pursues a firm and workable propaganda program and does not serve to cover up the mistakes of the State Department or the incumbent administration.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

The United States Congress should investigate the wartime and postwar operation of the Army Intelligence (G-2) and the Counterintelligence Agency.

In our search for the missing Van Vliet report in the Army Intelligence Agency, there was revealed a very serious lack of close liaison between the various Government agencies.

There was revealed to the committee a definite pro-Soviet sympathy by certain people working for G-2 during the war. In early 1942 one of our military attachés connected with Intelligence recommended that counterintelligence measures be set up against the Russians; he was advised that he showed a Russian bias and did
not know what he was doing. Several men who were openly anti-Russian were soon transferred out of this department. Documents were missing from this department which tended to be contrary to Russian interests. It was pointed out to our committee in executive session that quite a number of employees in G-2 who were suspected of Communist or leftwing sympathies were transferred to the Counter-Intelligence Agency. Just several months ago two German officials of an agency which is the equivalent of our Federal Bureau of Investigation refused to make use of our Counter-Intelligence Agency because they stated the German division of this agency was infiltrated by the Communists.

Mr. Harriman in his testimony stated that on the “strong recommendation of our Chiefs of Staff” every effort was made to get Russia to come into the war against Japan. The quick and complete collapse of Japan took everyone by surprise because we thought the American armies would be forced to land on the plains of Tokyo. Postwar revelations proved that Japan sought out Russian help about 6 months prior to the end of the war, pleading with Russia to act as a peace intermediary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were undoubtedly following the advice of Army Intelligence agencies, which apparently were grossly mistaken.

Did Russian influence in our Army Intelligence contribute to this gross miscalculation of Japan’s fighting capabilities? If so, is this element still in Army Intelligence? For the peace and security of our country, some independent body, such as Congress, should investigate.

Mr. Alvin E. O’Konski concurs in the above statement of Mr. Sheehan.
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF MESSRS. MADDEN, FLOOD, AND MACHROWICZ

We have carefully examined the statement submitted by Mr. Sheehan. We believe that the final report adopted unanimously and signed by all the members of the committee adequately and fully explains all the matters contained in this addendum. We are therefore submitting no additional remarks.
APPENDIX

EXCERPTS FROM INTERIM REPORT, JULY 2, 1952

I. INTRODUCTION

The committee’s first public hearing was held in Washington on October 11, 1951. It heard the testimony of Lt. Col. Donald B. Stewart, a United States Army officer, who as a German prisoner of war, was taken by the Germans to view the mass graves at Katyn in May 1943. (See pt. I of the committee’s published hearings.)

The next set of hearings was held in Washington on February 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1952. Seven witnesses appeared and rendered an account of their knowledge relating to the Katyn massacre. (See pt. II of the published hearings.)

In Chicago on March 13, 14, 1952, eight other witnesses were heard by this committee. (See pt. III of the published hearings.)

In London on April 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1952, 29 witnesses were heard. (See pt. IV of the published hearings.)

In Frankfurt, Germany, on April 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26, 1952, 27 witnesses were heard. (See pt. V of the published hearings.)

In Berlin, Germany, on April 25, a subcommittee heard testimony from members of the German Commission on Human Rights and received approximately 100 depositions which had been taken by that organization.

In Naples, Italy, on April 27, testimony of Dr. Palmieri was heard.

In Washington on June 3 and 4, 1952, testimony was heard from five witnesses.

In the course of the hearings held by this committee to date, testimony has been taken from a total of 81 witnesses; 183 exhibits have been studied and made part of the record, and more than 100 depositions were taken from witnesses who could not appear at the hearings. In addition, the committee staff has questioned more than 200 other individuals who offered to appear as witnesses but whose information was mostly of a corroborating nature.

LETTERS OF INVITATION

The committee unanimously agreed that in order to make this a full, fair, and impartial investigation, it would be willing to hear any individual, organization, or government having possessions of factual evidence or information pertaining to the Katyn massacre.

Letters of invitation were forwarded to the Government of the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government in Warsaw, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, and the German Federal Republic. The
German Federal Republic and the Polish Government-in-Exile accepted the invitation.

The Soviet Government rejected the invitation of the committee with the statement that a Special Soviet Commission (composed of all Russian citizens) had thoroughly investigated the Katyn massacre in January 1944 and consequently there was no need for reopening the issue. However, the Soviet Government did attach to their reply the special commission's report and it later was made part of the permanent record of this committee. (See pp. 223 through 247, pt. III of the published hearings.)

The Polish Government in Warsaw transmitted to the American Embassy a note likewise rejecting the committee's invitation, part of which is quoted as follows:

"The attitude of the Polish Government re the activities of this committee was expressed in the declaration of the Polish Government published on March 1, 1952, and the Polish Government does not intend to return to this matter again."

The entire note may be found on page 504 of part IV of the public hearings of this committee.

The attitude of the Polish Government as quoted above was revealed by the vicious propaganda blast issued in the form of a press release and circulated to all newspaper correspondents by the Polish Embassy in Washington. The chairman of the committee published this press release in its entirety in the Congressional Record on March 11, 1952, and called upon the Secretary of State to take prompt action relative to the propaganda activities of the Polish Embassy here in Washington. The Secretary of State on March 20, 1952, delivered a stern reprimand to the Polish Embassy regarding such press releases and greatly restricted its activities in this field.

**HOUSE RESOLUTION 539**

The first two series of hearings definitely established in the minds of this committee that it would be impossible to conduct a thorough investigation without obtaining the testimony of available witnesses in Europe. Consequently, the committee went before the House of Representatives on March 11, 1952, with House Resolution 539 which amended the original, House Resolution 390, and requested permission to take testimony from individuals and governments abroad. The House approved House Resolution 539 on March 11, 1952.

**FINDINGS**

This committee unanimously agrees that evidence dealing with the first phase of its investigation proves conclusively and irrevocably the Soviet NKVD (Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs) committed the massacre of Polish Army officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, not later than the spring of 1940.

This committee further concludes that the Soviets had plotted this criminal extermination of Poland's Intellectual leadership as early as the fall of 1939—shortly after Russia's treacherous invasion of the Polish nation's borders. There can be no doubt this massacre was a calculated plot to eliminate all Polish leaders who sub-
sequently would have opposed the Soviet's plans for communizing Poland.

In the course of its investigation, this committee has observed a striking similarity between what happened to the Polish officers in Katyn and the events now taking place in Korea. We unanimously agree that this committee would be remiss in its duty to the American people and the free people of the world if it failed to point out that the identical evasions by the Soviets to the Polish Government while the Poles were searching for their 15,000 missing officers in 1941, appear again in the delaying tactics now being used by the Communists in Korea.

This committee feels that Katyn may well have been a blueprint for Korea. Just as the Soviets failed for almost 2 years to account for the missing Polish officers, so to this day the Communists in Korea have failed to account for many thousands of captured United Nations soldiers. Among these are 8,000 Americans whom General Ridgway described as atrocity victims in his report to the United Nations last July, and the estimated 60,000 South Koreans still unaccounted for.

The Communists' delaying tactics in the Korean peace talks today may be from the same cloth as the nebulous replies received from the Soviets by the Poles in 1941-42 while they searched for their missing officers.

II. STATEMENT OF HISTORICAL FACTS

On September 1, 1939, Germany declared war on Poland and consequently World War II began.

On September 18, 1939 the Polish Ambassador in Moscow was handed a note by the Soviet Government which stated that the Soviet Government was no longer in a position to remain neutral and that the Soviet Government had given orders to the supreme commander of the Red army to close the frontier of the Polish Republic. This note was without provocation and terminated the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Nonaggression.

Then on September 17, 1939, the Soviets crossed the Polish border and, under the guise of coming to the Poles' assistance, occupied the eastern part of Poland.

On September 28, 1939, the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty (commonly known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) was announced to the world. Under this treaty Poland was divided—with Germany taking 72,806 miles, population 22 million; the U.S.S.R. taking 77,020 square miles, population 13 million.

From September 1939 through March 1940 a deliberate well-organized plan was executed by the NKVD to separate Polish Army officers and intellectual leaders from the mass of other Polish prisoners and the placing of those selected in three camps in Soviet Russia, namely, Kozelsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov.

On June 22, 1941, the Germans attacked the U.S.S.R. On July 30, 1941, the U.S.S.R. and Poland signed an agreement renewing diplomatic relations. Under this agreement, all Poles interned in Soviet prison camps within the territory of the U.S.S.R. were to be released by the Soviets. The same agreement provided for the forma-
tion of a Polish Army whose commander was to be appointed by the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.

On August 14, 1941, the Polish-U.S.S.R. military pact was signed. On August 16, 1941, General Anders began his fruitless search for the missing Polish officers.

On April 13, 1943, the Germans announced the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn Forest in Russia containing bodies of Polish Army officers, intelligentsia, Government officials, and clergy.

On April 15, 1943, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross to send a delegation to investigate on the spot the true state of affairs at the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk, Russia.

On April 25, 1943, V. M. Molotov, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. sent a note to Mr. T. Romer, Polish Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Ambassador Romer refused to accept the note.

On April 26, 1943, the U.S.S.R. severed diplomatic relations with Poland because Poland had approached the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct a neutral investigation.

On April 30, 1943, a medical commission of leading representatives of medical jurisprudence and criminology from 12 European universities and neutral countries, selected by the Germans, signed a protocol establishing these Polish officers were massacred in the spring of 1940.

On January 24, 1944, the Soviet Special Commission To Investigate the Katyn Massacre released its own report stating that the Nazi Germans had committed the atrocity after the Poles fell captive to the Nazis in July–August 1941.

On July 1 and 2, 1946, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg heard testimony from both German and Russian witnesses concerning the Katyn massacre. No decision as to guilt was announced by the tribunal.

III. TESTIMONY OF SURVIVORS OF THE THREE CAMPS

Thousands of Poles were taken prisoners by the Soviet after its invasion of Poland in September 1939. These prisoners were grouped in some hundred-odd camps in Poland’s eastern territories and the western provinces of the Soviet territory. However, three of these camps were especially designated for the confinement of Polish officers, lawyers, doctors, clergy, professionals, government officials, and intellectual leaders—most of whom were reserve officers in the Polish Army.

These camps and the number of Polish prisoners interned in each are as follows: Kobielsk, located east of Smolensk, imprisoned 5,000; Starobielsk, near Kharkov, held 4,000 Polish officers; and Ostashkov, near Kalinin, where 6,400 Poles were interned.

The committee heard testimony from 26 Polish officers who had originally been interned in one of these three camps. Their testimony revealed that—

(1) A deliberate effort has been made by the Soviets to segregate the officers into groups. The majority of higher ranking Polish military officers were interned along with hundreds of Polish doctors—all army reservists—in Kobielsk. Noncommissioned officers
and Poland's peacetime political and educational leaders—also reservists—were interned in Starobielsk. And, finally, Poland's frontier guards, home police, and public officials of eastern Poland were interned in Ostashkov. Religious leaders were interned in all three camps.

(2) There is general agreement that these special prisoners in the three camps totaled about 15,400. They comprised the elite of the Polish military and civilian leaders.

(3) This NKVD action was a planned, well-conceived, and highly organized separation of the Polish intelligentsia to pick out potential leaders of Poland after the war.

(4) These were not ordinary prisoner-of-war camps, but installations heavily guarded by the select NKVD, as contrasted to ordinary Soviet prisoner-of-war camps which were guarded by ordinary Russian soldiers.

(5) These prisoners remained at the three camps from September-October 1939, until April-May 1940.

INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS

(6) This 6 months' internment was meant as a period of political investigation and observation. Each prisoner was examined exhaustively and in each instance several times—mostly during the night, with some interviews lasting several hours.

(a) The NKVD placed great emphasis on the social origin, political views, party adherences, professional qualifications and in particular—if the prisoner had participated in Poland's successful defeat of the Bolsheviks in 1920.

(b) During the long and exhausting interrogations, discussions were held on the subject of war, its reasons and probable outcome, the attitude of the prisoner toward Russia and particularly his knowledge of the Soviet Union.

(7) It is obvious to the committee from this line of questioning and from the conclusions of the witnesses that the Soviets were trying to determine if any of these prisoners eventually could be converted to communism. Evidence clearly established that from this entire group of Poles interned at the three camps, only six subsequently joined Soviet forces.

(8) About March 1940, the interrogations were completed and it was announced almost simultaneously in Kozielsk, Ostashkov, and Starobielsk the camps would shortly be liquidated. Rumors began to circulate in the camp that the prisoners would be sent home. According to testimony presented to this committee by witnesses both in America and Europe, the camp authorities, when speaking to the prisoners, encouraged these rumors.

During evacuation of the 3 camps, groups of 200 to 300 Poles left each day, sometimes every second day and sometimes every third day.

(9) The evacuation continued in the three camps until the middle of May 1940. From among this entire group of 15,400 Poles interned in the 3 camps only 400 survived. These were taken to another NKVD camp at Pavilishev-Bor where the Soviets continued questioning them in hopes of converting them to communism.
(a) Apart from the small group of 400 Poles who survived (listed in exhibit 2, part IV of the published hearings), the world has never heard from a single other Pole who was interned in these camps between the period September-October 1939, and April-May 1940.

(b) The Polish Government-in-exile and relatives who subsequently fled from Communist Poland have tirelessly searched for these missing men for 12 years. In not a single instance have any of these prisoners been heard from or seen since May 1940, except the 4,143 identified in the mass graves of Katyn.

(c) In October of 1940, when the Soviets began to fear an assault by the Nazis, certain members of this group of 400 survivors were asked to form a staff for a proposed Polish Army in Russia. It was apparent this group did not have enough qualified men for such a staff. One witness testified in London that he asked the Soviet Minister of State Security Mirkulow why the Russians didn't select this staff from among those Poles evacuated from Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov. Mirkulow replied: "We have committed an error. These men are not available. We will give you others." This statement was made by Mirkulow 6 months after the Russians evacuated the three camps. (See p. 553, vol. IV of the published hearings.)

RUSS ADMIT THEIR "BLUNDER"

(d) This same witness related similar statements made by Soviet Minister Beria of the NKVD to Lieutenant Colonel Berling, one of the six Poles who turned traitor and joined the Soviet forces in 1941. Berling likewise asked Beria in October of 1940, why the Soviets didn't enlist the officers from these camps in the proposed Polish Army. Beria replied: "We have committed a great blunder. We have made a great mistake." (See p. 554, vol. IV of the published hearings.)

(10) All correspondence from those interned in the three camps ended May 1940.

(a) While interned at Pavlishe-Bor, the 400 survivors continued to correspond with their families in Poland and those testifying before this committee said they received countless inquiries regarding the fate of their compatriots who were previously interned in the three camps.

(b) A Special Family Bureau established by the Poles in Russia following the reapprochement of 1941 received thousands of inquiries regarding the missing officers. In not a single instant was it reported that any news of these officers was received in Poland subsequent to May 1940.

(11) Only those Poles interned at Kozielsk were massacred in the Katyn Forest.

(a) Numerous survivors of the Kozielsk camp testified they saw inscriptions written by those who departed earlier: "We are being unloaded in Gniezdo." This rail station is 12 miles west of Smolensk and 2 miles from Katyn Forest.

(b) One of the survivors from Kozielsk who was actually taken to Gniezdo and then spared in the last moment said he saw NKVD guards with fixed bayonets guarding the Poles while they were
being removed from the train into lorries which had backed up to the train.

"The prisoners were asked to go into the autobus, and not stopping on the ground, but just to go from the railroad wagon immediately into the back door of the autobus. The autobus was of quite an ordinary type. The windows were painted, or rather smeared with some white color—I imagine it was just smeared with lime—and the autobus took about 30 people. Then it went away, and returned after more or less half an hour—I cannot tell exactly, because I had no watch with me, but about half an hour—take the next party and this proceeded for some hours. * * * (See p. 606, vol. IV of the published hearings.)"

It is significant to note that this witness mentions that the NKVD had guarded the Polish officers being removed from the train and that the NKVD were armed with fixed bayonets. Testimony presented to this committee by doctors who had performed autopsies on the bodies of the massacred Poles found in Katyn, was conclusive that besides the bullet hole shown in the head which was the cause of death of most of these men, there were some who showed signs of bayoneting. Dr. Miloslavich testified in Chicago that the bayonet wounds were of the four-bladed type which are used exclusively by the Soviets.

(c) The last entry in the diary found on the massacred body of Maj. Adam Solski in the Katyn Forest, dated April 8, 1940, stated:

"From noon we are standing at Smolensk on a railway siding.

"April 9, 1940, a few minutes before 5 in the morning reveille in the prison cars and preparation for departure. * * * We are to go somewhere by car, and what then?"

"April 9, 1940, 5 a.m.

"April 9, 1940. From the very dawn, the day started somewhat peculiarly. Departure by prison van in little cells (terrible); they brought us somewhere into the woods—some kind of summer resort. Here a detailed search. They took the watch, on which time was 6:30 a.m. (8:30), asked me for my wedding ring, which they took, roubles, my main belt and pocket knife."

The diary ends there. It is included in the transcript of the committee's hearing in London as exhibit 28 (pp. 726 to 731, pt. IV). This diary was brought to the committee's attention by General Bor-Komorowski, who testified in London, and by other witnesses previously heard in Washington and Chicago.

(12) Prisoners evacuated from Starobielsk testified they also saw inscriptions in train prison cars but in this case they stated: "We are being removed or unloaded in Kharkov." (See p. 525, pt. IV.)

(13) The trail of prisoners evacuated from Ostashkov ends at Wiasma.

(a) Zygmunt Luszczynski, of London, testified that after he was evacuated from Ostashkov on April 24, 1940, his train composed of seven cars, stopped at Wiasma. He stated:

"We were taken from Ostashkov to Wiasma, where we remained at the siding for 3 days; then six of the seven cars were disconnect-ed and they went in some other direction, and the car in which I was present was taken to Babynino (enroute to Pavlishev Bor). (See p. 614, part IV.)"
(b) Other testimony strongly supports the theory that the Ostashkov prisoners were drowned in the White Sea.

c) Adam Moszynski, himself a former prisoner at Starobielsk, author of the most authentic list of names of prisoners interned in the three camps (see exhibit 5A in the appendix of part III) testified:

"I am sure there are three Katyns in the world. One Katyn is in the Katyn Forest, near Gniedzovo (Smolensk); the second Katyn, of Starobielsk, could be near Kharkov, and the prisoners of Ostashkov, near the White Sea. * * *"
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

Routes Taken by Polish Prisoners of War Evacuated from the Three Camps: Kozielek, Ostaszkov, and Starobielesk During the Spring of 1940 While the Territory Still Was in Soviet Hands

Legend

- The route of the murdered Polish officers subsequently found buried in the mass graves at Katyn.
- Probable route of those missing but not found at Katyn.
- Route of the 400 Polish officers who survived.
- Route of these 400 survivors when they eventually were released by the Soviet and permitted to join the Polish Army in Russia in 1941.
"To the best of my knowledge, based on considerable research on the subject, the prisoner's in Ostashkov were placed on two very old barges, and when the barges were towed out to sea they were destroyed by Russian artillery fire."

(14) Col. George Grobicki, who had been interned in Kozielisk, testified that:

"Everybody was dressed when leaving the camp just as he was when taken prisoner. Most of the people were in overcoats when they left the camps."

This testimony corroborates to a great extent the testimony of numerous witnesses who had actually been taken to the scene of the graves and who had observed that most of the bodies of the massacred Polish officers were buried either wearing overcoats or winter underwear.

Grobicki's testimony becomes very pertinent when we recall that in the Soviet countercharge accusing the Nazis for this crime, Russian witnesses claim these prisoners were executed by the Germans as early as August of 1941. This committee considers it doubtful the victims would be wearing winter garb in August.

(15) Even more startling was Grobicki's testimony that when he read the list of Poles being removed from the graves in Katyn published by the Germans shortly after the discovery of the graves in 1943, he noted that these bodies were being exhumed in the same group formations as they were when evacuated from Kozielisk. It is difficult to accept the theory that these men who allegedly left Kozielisk in April of 1940, to be assigned to special work units west of Smolensk by the Russians, should remain in the identical groupings until 1941 when they were allegedly murdered by the Germans.

(16) This committee has tried to establish how the 400 who survived from the three camps were selected. General Wolkowicki, testifying in London, said he believed he was spared because prior to Poland's rebirth, following World War I, he was a Russian Naval officer who won distinction in the Russo-Japanese War.

"I was the only officer who opposed the surrender of (this Russian) ship, and that is why their attitude toward me was one of considerable interest. (See p. 645, pt. IV.)"

(A) General Wolkowicki showed this committee an immunization card given to him by the Russians while he was interned at Kozielisk. He testified hundreds of similar cards subsequently were found on the bodies of Poles exhumed in Katyn. (See exhibit 17, pt. IV.)

This committee considers itself fortunate in getting the testimony of the above-mentioned witnesses who constitute only a small group of the 400 survivors taken to Griaizovec by the Soviets in June 1940, and who remained there until they were released on July 30, 1941, to join the Polish Army. Their testimony has been instrumental toward helping this committee arrive at a conclusion.

IV. SEARCH FOR THE MISSING POLISH OFFICERS

Having established that approximately 15,400 Polish officers and leaders had been imprisoned in these three major camps and that after June 1940 only 400 were known to be alive, the next major
trend of the committee's evidence deals with the efforts of the Polish Government in Exile in London to find traces of the missing Polish officers from August 1941, through the entire year of 1942. This official Polish search resulted from one of the quirks of history:

Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia had been allies from August 1939, and particularly during the fourth dismemberment of Poland. In mid-June 1941, this unholy totalitarian alliance fell apart when Hitler's legions swept across the Russian boundaries to overwhelm the Russian armies. Within 2 months the Nazis had driven into the Ukraine past the area of Smolensk.

Following the German's attack and their overwhelming military victories, which were driving the Russians into dangerous retreats, the Soviet leaders were temporarily desirous of securing military aid from anywhere and anybody. As part of the Kremlin's negotiating with the British Government, the Soviets recognized the Polish Government in Exile in London.

The Soviets and the Polish Government entered into an agreement in July 1941, whereby all the Polish prisoners in Russia, except acknowledged criminals, were to be granted an amnesty by the Soviets and be transferred to specially designated camps where they would be organized into Polish army divisions under Polish officers. It was expected that this reborn Polish Army would join Russian armies in their fight against the Nazis. As part of this official arrangement, General Wladislaw Anders, who was at that time a prisoner in the Lubianka prison in Moscow, was accepted by the Russians as commanding general of the proposed Polish armed forces.

ANDERS SEES STALIN

When he was released, General Anders immediately sought to collect as his staff officers those men whom he personally knew had been captured by the Soviets. Shortly after the arrangement between the Soviets and the Poles and the appointment of General Anders as Polish commander in chief, small groups of Polish soldiers from Griazovec and other prison camps joined the Anders command. Only 400 of the officers reporting had been numbered among the 15,400 men who had been at Kozielsk, and Ostashkov prior to May 1940. Very few of these men were the staff officers whom Anders knew personally and whom he needed. Where were the other 15,000 Polish leaders? From then until the summer of 1942 when General Anders commenced to move his Polish troops out of Russia into the Middle East he continued his search for these officers. Repeated requests, personal and official, were made to the Russian general staff, to the Russian foreign office, and even to the NKVD, for information about these missing officers.

General Anders in addition to making official representations to the Russian Government authorized one of his officers, Maj. Josef Czapski, to make a search for these officers throughout Soviet prisons. General Anders also secured an interview with Premier Stalin in December 1941.

At this meeting, General Anders accompanied the head of the Polish Government in Exile, General Sikorski, and the Polish Am-
bassador in Moscow, Mr. Kot. Stalin personally was asked about these missing Polish officers. The Soviet Premier insisted he was not detaining them nor did he have them.

General Anders testified in London before this committee:

"We inquired, 'Well, where could they have gone?' To this Stalin replied, 'They escaped.' We asked, 'Where could they have escaped?' And Stalin replied, 'To Manchuria.' I said that this was impossible."

Anders had a second meeting with Stalin at the Kremlin in Moscow of the 18th of March 1942. At this meeting with Stalin, Anders presented him with a list of missing Polish officers and told Stalin that none of the officers had as yet reported to the Polish Army.

Stalin replied: "Well, what good would they be to us? Why would we want to be keeping them or retaining them?" At this same meeting Stalin hinted that maybe the Polish officers had fled and become separated when the Germans invaded Russia.

It is noteworthy, however, when a committee member explicitly asked whether any Russian official at any time said that the Polish officers might have become German prisoners, General Anders replied: "Never." Anders testified: "This to us was one of the most disturbing factors because we knew that the Bolshevists had made very long and lengthy and complete lists of all their prisoners."

General Anders' testimony about his discussions with the highest Soviet officials regarding the missing Polish officers was independently verified by the testimony of Ambassador Stanislaus Kot, the first Polish Ambassador to Moscow under the new arrangement of July 1941.

VISHINSKY AND MOLOTOV QUESTIONED

Testifying in London, Kot said from the 20th of September 1941, until his departure from Moscow in the fall of 1942, he (Kot) made repeated inquiries to all levels of Soviet officialdom, to the NKVD, to Vishinsky, to Molotov, and even to Stalin himself, for information regarding these missing Polish officers. The incident of the conference between Kot and Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky on October 6, 1940, was characteristic of these meetings.

Kot complained to Vishinsky that only 2,000 Polish officers of an estimated 9,500 whose names were known to the Poles had reappeared among the Polish forces. Kot asked Vishinsky what had happened to the other officers saying:

"We have been making constant effort to find these people. We have searched for these men in the German prison camps in occupied Poland. Every place where they could conceivably have been found."

Kot said that he did not see how thousands of men could disappear. Vishinsky never answered the question but parried it with a confused: "Well, what do you think happened to these men?" Subsequently, Vishinsky stated: "They must be among the 300,000 Polish nationalists who have already been freed."

When Kot discussed the same questions with Soviet Foreign Min-

ister Molotov, on October 22, 1941, Molotov put him off with the statement: "We will try to do everything possible."
Similarly, during the meeting with Stalin on November 14, 1941, when Kot emphasized the anxiety of the Poles regarding the missing officers, Stalin at first asked: "Are there still some Poles not released?" And stated: "Amnesty knows no exceptions. We released all, even those people who were sent to ---*--- destroy bridges and kill Soviet people, even those people were released by us."

It is worth noting that Stalin's categorical assertion was made several months after the Germans had overrun the Smolensk area; and still the Soviet leaders gave no indication that they even thought the Polish officers might have been captured by the Germans.

The diplomatic memoranda of the conversations between General Anders and Ambassador Kot with Molotov, Vishinsky, and Stalin are part of the committee's record. They reveal any number of fictitious Soviet reasons why the Polish officers had not been located. Never once did these high Soviet officials, nor did any other Communist official of a high or low echelon, indicate to any of the Poles that those Polish prisoners of war might have been captured by the Germans.

It has been established by the record that the Polish Government in London employed its underground in Poland to check German prisoner-of-war camps to discover if any of these Russian-captured Poles might have been recaptured by the Germans. These efforts, like the negotiations in Russia, ended in negative results.

It was not until the Germans announced the discovery of the Katyn graves on April 13, 1943, that the Soviets first claimed these Polish prisoners had been moved into the Smolensk area in the spring of 1940. This evidence proves that the Soviet Government either was lying to the Poles during 1941 and 1942, when the Kremlin leaders said that they did not know where the prisoners of war might be, or else the Soviets were lying in their 1943 and 1944 reports, when they claimed the Poles had been moved to the Smolensk area in the spring of 1940 and subsequently captured by the Germans in 1941.

ALL LETTERS RETURNED

The committee has testimony from a Special Family Bureau which had been established by the Polish Government in Gangi Gul, Russia, to try to trace the missing Polish officers.

Major General Kaczkowski and Capt. Eugene Lubomirski, Directors of this Family Bureau, testified in London that they personally had examined hundreds, virtually thousands of letters from relatives in Poland, inquiring about these missing officers. In every instance, they testified, each of the letters and postal cards had stated that the last time the families heard from the Polish officers was in April and May of 1940.

These witnesses further testified that they had personally examined hundreds of letters addressed by the families to the prisoners interned in these three camps subsequent to May 1940, all of those letters were returned by the Russian authorities with the inscriptions that the whereabouts of these Polish officers were unknown.

It is inconceivable that the highly developed bureaucracy of the Soviets would have permitted the NKVD to lose complete trace of
so potent a force as these 15,000 Polish officers after they had left the three camps in the Spring of 1940. (See testimony starting on p. 628, pt. IV.)

All of the foregoing testimony which the committee has heard from Anders, Kot, and Czapski was reported to the American colonel, Henry I. Szymanski, when he was assistant United States military attaché at Cairo, Egypt. Szymanski testified that he was assigned in March of 1942 to be United States liaison officer with the Poles in Russia, but that he was never granted a visa to enter Russia.

Szymanski’s specific assignment was to ascertain what had happened to the Polish officers in Russia, because the United States considered these Polish officers essential to the Allied war effort. Consequently, Szymanski met with all the high-ranking Polish officer survivors as they came out of Russia during the latter part of 1942 and 1943, and he reported all of the foregoing testimony to the Assistant Chief of Staff for G-2.

During the 22-month effort by the Poles to locate their missing officers, General Anders with his staff had carefully commenced preparing a list of names of those who were interned in the three camps. This list was prepared on the basis of information supplied General Anders by the 400 survivors who were grouped at Griazovec.

During his conference with Stalin in December, General Sikorski personally handed the Russian premier a list bearing more than 3,000 names and again Sikorski was assured that it was Stalin’s understanding all of these men had been released.

Testimony heard by this committee proves conclusively that not once during all of these top-level conversations had the Russians either stated or hinted that these missing men might have fallen into German hands.

The committee believes if the Soviets were innocent, there was no reason why they should not have admitted to the Poles that their officers had fallen into German hands. But if they were guilty, they had a cogent reason for not telling such a story. So long as the Soviets insisted they didn’t know the whereabouts of the Polish officers, nobody could prove they were dead.

V. DISCOVERY OF GRAVES AT KATYN

The Polish Government’s search for the missing officers came to an abrupt end on April 13, 1943, when the following Berlin broadcast by the Germans shocked the world:

"From Smolenski comes news that the native population has revealed to German authorities the spot where in secret mass executions the Bolsheviks murdered 10,000 Polish officers. German authorities made a horrible discovery. They found a pit 28 meters long and 16 meters wide in which, 12 deep, lay, the bodies of 3,000 Polish officers. In full uniform, in some cases shackled, all had wounds from pistol bullets in the back of the neck. Search and discovery of other pits continue."

This German announcement was followed by an intense campaign of Nazi propaganda aimed at the political exploitation of the discovery.
German Foreign Office documents which were captured by the Allies and turned over to the United States and Britain for joint custody were traced by the committee in England. These documents which are included in part V of the public hearings clearly show that Goebbels and other top Nazi officials had given instructions to exploit the propaganda value of this discovery to its fullest.

These documents also show the desperate efforts made by the Nazis to persuade the International Committee of the Red Cross to make an impartial investigation of the shocking discovery.

Hitler himself is quoted as having instructed his Foreign Office to use every means to get an investigation by the International Red Cross. One of the documents states:

"In following up the invitation issued by the German Red Cross to Geneva, that the International Red Cross should take part in the identification of the Russian atrocities against Polish officers, the Führer tonight ordered an actual invitation to be dispatched to Geneva by the German Red Cross. This extra invitation is to be signed by the Duke of Coburg so that the weight of his international name should be used."

The German claim was: The presence of these graves was called to the attention of the Nazis by Russian natives of the area; there was no question that these were Polish officers and that they were executed in the spring of 1940 by the Soviets. The Germans drew this immediate conclusion from an investigation of letters, diaries, and newspapers found on the bodies of the victims and from statements made by Russian natives in the area.

POLES SEEK RED CROSS INVESTIGATION

The Polish Government's immediate reaction was one of shock. In view of its long search for the missing officers, the Polish Government likewise issued an invitation to the International Committee of the Red Cross. After a meeting of the Council of Ministers the Polish Minister of National Defense issued a statement in which he said (see exhibit 30A, p. 748, pt. IV):

"We have become accustomed to the lies of German propaganda and we understand the purpose behind its latest revelations. In view however, of abundant and detailed German information concerning the discovery of the bodies of many thousands of Polish officers near Smolensk and the categorical statement that they were murdered by the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940, the necessity has arisen that the mass graves discovered should be investigated and the facts alleged verified by a competent international body such as the International Red Cross. The Polish Government has therefore approached this institution with a view of their sending a delegation to the place where the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war is said to have taken place."

The Soviet's immediate reaction was voiced by Molotov when he termed this a discovery of archeological remains. On April 19, 1943, the Soviet newspaper, Pravda, carried a front-page editorial which attacked the Polish Government's request for assistance of the International Red Cross in "investigating something that never happened." A day later, Izvestia carried a reprint of the editorial and said it fully reflects the position of leading Soviet circles. Thus,
even at this late date the Soviets attempted to conceal their hideous crime.

Molotov's first reaction can be understood in the light of the testimony presented before this committee by General Rudolph von Gersdorff, German Intelligence Officer, who was among the first to arrive in the Smolensk area following the German invasion. Discussing the discovery of the graves Von Gersdorff said:

"In the vicinity of Gniezdowo, there were prehistoric Russian cairns, old prehistoric tombs in caves. They were overgrown with shrubs and heavily so. They were actually in that area, so that was the reason why, when the graves of the Polish officers were discovered, we did not call it the murders of Gniezdowo, but to distinguish it from these old prehistoric tombs of Gniezdowo, we called it the murders of Katyn, so as not to get these two things mixed up."

This committee has heard considerable evidence from other sources that the whole area of Katyn had been used by the Bolshevists as early as 1929 for mass executions.

Only after the Germans had definitely established that the discovery was indeed valid did the Russians present a countercharge which they maintain to this day: the Poles interned in the three camps had been transferred by the Russians to other camps in the vicinity of Smolensk during March and April of 1940 and were taken prisoner by the Germans during the Russian retreat. The Russians flatly accused the Germans of executing "11,000" Polish officers in 1941.

The Polish Red Cross was informed by the International Committee of the Red Cross that a neutral investigation of the Katyn discovery could be made only if all three nations involved participated, namely, Poland, Germany, and Russia.

Russia's formal reaction to the Polish Government's request for a neutral investigation of Katyn by the International Red Cross was the abrupt break of diplomatic relations with the Poles. The Soviets bitterly denounced the Poles for "collaborating with the Nazis."

All subsequent efforts by the British Foreign Office and the American State Department to heal the Russo-Polish breach were met with invectives hurled by the Soviets.

This loud reaction of Soviet injured innocence is construed by this committee as being the resource of a cornered culprit begging the question. There is no question that Russia's retaliatory move severing diplomatic relations with the Poles was motivated primarily to divert attention from the Poles' request for an International Red Cross investigation.

VI. TESTIMONY OF OBSERVERS PRESENT AT KATYN WHEN THE BODIES WERE EXUMED

Even before the Germans made their announcement, a leading Swedish correspondent, Christer Jaederlunt, correspondent of the Stockholm Tidningen, was invited by the German Ministry of Propaganda to visit Katyn. When he learned the purpose of the visit, the Swedish journalist admitted that he felt he was being used by German propagandists to spread their anti-Soviet themes. Yet this newspaperman, after viewing the Katyn graves and making such investigation as he himself wanted, refused to even consider that
this could have been only a propaganda show staged by the Germans.

The committee explicitly asked Jaederlunt, when he testified in Frankfurt, if he, as a neutral newspaperman, could have conceived this Katyn affair as a German "propaganda show." Jaederlunt's answer was very significant, and it characterized the attitude of all the committee's witnesses who had visited the Katyn graves. Jaederlunt said:

"We actually went there with this suspicion [that Katyn was a German 'propaganda show']. We did not trust Goebbels and thought that it would be possible he would be capable of doing such a thing. But when I stood in front of the mass graves and when I realized what an atrocious crime had been perpetrated there, all my suspicions vanished and my own newspaper, at first, was not prepared to publish this report, but I insisted upon the reports being published because I said: 'The world at large must know about this matter.'" (See pt. V of the published hearings.)

The testimony of the Swedish journalist Jaederlunt clearly established that he would have preferred to have considered the Katyn massacre as a German atrocity. Mr. Jaederlunt concluded his testimony as follows:

"Then and now I was and I am absolutely convinced that the Russians committed it. I do not wish to say the Russians. I would rather amend it to the NKVD." (See pt. V of the published hearings.)

During the Chicago hearings, Casimir Skarzynski reported on his official visit to the Katyn graves. This witness was the deputy chairman of the Polish Red Cross in German-occupied Poland. The Polish Red Cross, when the Germans first informed them about the Katyn graves, refused to accept the German statement on the basis that "this is a pure propaganda move, and the Red Cross must keep away from any propaganda."

Skarzynski was directed by Polish Red Cross officials to go to supervise the exhumation and proper reburial of these Polish officers. While at Katyn, the Polish Red Cross official was moved by the facts he personally witnessed to admit that the German Army in this instance was innocent. (See pt. III of the published hearings.)

AMERICAN ARMY OFFICERS VISIT KATYN

The most significant testimony of the independent witnesses who visited Katyn shortly after the German announcement of the graves' discovery was provided by two American army officers, Lt. Col. Donald B. Stewart and Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr.

These officers had been captured by the Germans in north Africa and were taken to Germany as prisoners of war. These two Americans with two British officers had been compelled by German authorities to visit Katyn in May 1943. Stewart's suspicions of the German purpose was indicated by his testimony to the effect "that I was there [Katyn] under orders; that I felt the matter was a propaganda effort, and, in any event, it was a political effort. * * * I had no desire to have anything to do with a propaganda effort or a political matter." (See pt. I of the published hearings.)

Similarly, Van Vliet in his written report stated:
"I hated the Germans. I didn’t want to believe them. * * * When I became involved in the visit to Katyn I realized that the Germans would do their best to convince me that Russia was guilty. I made up my mind not to be convinced by what must be a propaganda effort * * *." 

Likewise, in his oral testimony to the committee, Van Vliet stated:

"As a prisoner of war, I had a personal grudge against them [the Germans] and as an American army officer I had a professional grudge against them. * * * So the German story was one that I did not want to believe. * * *" (See pt. II of the published hearings.)

It is particularly noteworthy that both officers independently emphasized the same convincing factor, which they both stated had not been brought to their attention by the Germans but which was an independent deduction from their own observations. This was the evident fact that the clearly undisturbed corpse were clothed in winter attire which was in an excellent state of repair, showing practically no wear. The two officers also independently made these same observations about the condition of the boots of the Polish officers. In both instances the officers stated from their own personal experience as prisoners of war in a German camp that clothing could not have remained in that condition if it had been worn for a year in a prison camp.

Hence, Colonel Stewart stated:

"The decision I reached, I can never forget. My decision was that those [Polish] men were killed by the Russians while they were prisoners of the Russians * * *." (See pt. I of the published hearings.)

In similar fashion Colonel Van Vliet in his oral testimony stated:

"If those Polish officers had been alive and in prison camp until the Germans overran the Polish prison camps, and if the Germans had in fact killed these Polish officers, then by the very virtue of the fact that their clothes had been worn and their shoes had been walked in, they would show much more wear. * * *" Likewise in his written report, Van Vliet explicitly recorded his sincere conviction:

"The sum of circumstantial evidence, impressions formed at the time of looking at the graves, what I saw in peoples’ faces—all force the conclusion that Russia did it." (See pt. II of the published hearings.)

SOME VICTIMS BURIED ALIVE

Zbigniew Rowinski, who testified in London, said he had been taken to Katyn by the Germans in April of 1943. Rowinski at the time was a German prisoner of war interned at Woldenberg. He said not all the victims were shot in the head:

"I suppose only those people who tried to defend themselves were bound, because I saw some bodies with the sawdust in their mouth and some of them had even their heads covered with their overcoats, then a string round the neck connected with string at the hands. So when they started to struggle to free the hands, they must have choked themselves." (See p. 992 pt. IV, of the published hearings.)
In London the committee heard the testimony of Ferdinand Goetel, an official of the Polish Red Cross who visited the graves at Katyn. The following is an exact quotation of the conversation the Polish Red Cross group had with Lieutenant Slovecik who was in charge of receiving of members of all delegations of all nationalities who went to Katyn at the time of the exhumations:

"Another even more interesting detail of our conversation with Slovecik was that although he was inclined to describe the whole case as a most dramatic incident from the Polish point of view—he had no idea where could have come from all these bodies of Polish officers. All he knew was what the local inhabitants had told him that they had been brought in transports arriving from the direction of Smolensk. As he already had in hand photographs and, I think, even originals of some of the letters and postcards found on the bodies he asked us whether we could explain why the address of Kozelisk repeated itself so often on many of the cards. I told him in short what I knew about the camps of Kozelisk, Ostaschkov, and Starobielisk and I closely watched his reaction to this piece of news. It was most lively and convinced me beyond all doubt that Slovecik had learned about Kozelisk only from us. It was the only detail of our conversation of which he made a note. A moment later, after we had finished our talk, I heard him repeating the news about Kozelisk to Olenbusch and to the other Germans. * * * (See p. 845, pt. IV of the published hearings.)"

Thus, from the above-quoted testimony, it is evident that the Germans were unaware of the camp in Russia where these Polish officers had been imprisoned during the period, September 1939 through May 1940.

VII. OTHER WITNESSES

This committee heard several witnesses whose testimony will be grouped under a special heading. Among these was a Pole who testified as an eyewitness to the massacre. His identity had to be concealed with a mask to prevent reprisals against his relatives still living in Poland. However, all the committee members are familiar with his identity.

Testifying as "John Doe" at the committee's second hearing in Washington, this witness maintained that he and two of his compatriots personally viewed the execution of 200 Poles by Russian soldiers in what he believed to be the Katyn Forest. These observations were made by the witness and his friends at the beginning of November after the trio escaped from a Russian prisoner-of-war camp at Pavilschchev Bor. (See p. 143 of pt. II.)

After relating how the trio observed the Poles being led into the forest, the witness continued:

"Two of them [Russian soldiers] seized their hands and held them in back and one of the Russian soldiers lifted his chin up [the victim's] took him by the head, opened his mouth and shoved a handful of sawdust into his mouth."

"John Doe" said most of the victims were executed with a shot through the back of their heads. Some, however, according to his testimony, were thrown into the graves alive and left to suffocate.
“John Doe” further stated he saw the Poles’ hands being bound in the back with wire prior to the execution.

This witness introduced new factors hitherto unknown to the committee: he said the executions he witnessed were in the early part of November; he said the victims’ hands were bound with wire; he said their mouths were stuffed with sawdust; and he said some of the victims were left to suffocate rather than shot in the head.

These observations, up to the time that John Doe testified, had never been published in any of the material prepared by the Polish Government during its lengthy research on the Katyn massacre. Subsequently, however, they were substantiated by witnesses appearing before this committee.

Colonel Groblicki, testifying in Washington, said groups of Polish officers were evacuated from Kozielsk as early as November. In London, Mr. Rowinski, an observer at the graves taken there as a German prisoner of war in 1943, testified he observed several victims with their mouths stuffed with sawdust. In Frankfurt, Dr. Tramsen, a member of the German International Medical Commission, testified several victims had their hands bound with wire. During the same hearing, Dr. Naville, of Switzerland, and also on the same Commission, said he believed some of the victims died of suffocation instead of gunshot wounds. Several German witnesses likewise observed the victims’ mouths stuffed with sawdust and hands tied with wire.

This committee heard testimony of many witnesses whose revelations were of a circumstantial nature. But in order to get the atmosphere surrounding all the facts of the Katyn massacre, their testimony was accepted and placed in the record.

Among these was Jerzy Lewszecki who testified in London. He said he was a German prisoner of war interned at the prison camp near Lubeck. In 1943 he had occasion to discuss the Katyn massacre with Stalin’s oldest son by a prior marriage who likewise was a German prisoner of war interned in the same camp.

Lewszecki said he discussed the disappearance of the Polish officers with Stalin’s son, who frankly admitted that the Poles were executed by the Soviets. “Why those were the intelligentsia, the most dangerous elements to us, and they had to be eliminated,” Lewszecki quoted Stalin’s son as saying. (See p. 777, pt. IV.)

During our latest hearing here in Washington, this committee heard testimony from Boris Olshansky of New York, a former Soviet army officer who escaped to this country in 1946. Olshansky related conversations he had in Moscow with N. N. Burdenko, director of the Special Soviet Commission which made an investigation for the Russians in January 1944. Burdenko supervised the exhumation of 925 bodies for the Soviet investigation and in the official report stated all of the Poles were executed in the autumn of 1941.

Olshansky testified Burdenko told him the Soviet report was false. He quoted Burdenko as saying:

“I was appointed by Stalin personally to go to the Katyn place. All the corpses were 4 years old. For me, as a medical man, this problem was quite clear. Our NKVD friends made a mistake.”
Olshansky further stated he was told by Burdenko that there are more Katyns in Russia.

"Katyns existed and are existing and will be existing," Olshansky quoted Burdenko as stating in Moscow in April of 1946. "Anyone who will go and dig up things in our country, Russia, would find a lot of things that we had to straighten out the protocol given by the Germans on the Katyn massacre," the aging Burdenko further told Olshansky.

VIII. TESTIMONY OF INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL COMMISSION

The Germans formed an International Medical Commission, composed of the leading scientists, pathologists, and professors of criminology from 12 different countries of Europe. The committee heard testimony from 5 of these doctors who participated in the exhumation of the bodies. They were provided with the necessary instruments to perform their own individual autopsies. The five doctors are:

- Dr. Edward Lucas Miloslavich (Croatia). (Part III of the published hearings.)
- Dr. Helge Tramsten (Denmark). (Part V of the published hearings.)
- Dr. Ferenc Orsos (Hungary). (Part V of the published hearings.)
- Dr. Francois Naville (Switzerland). (Part V of the published hearings.)
- Dr. Vincenzo Mario Palmieri (Italy). (Part V of the published hearings.)

All of the above-named doctors categorically and unequivocally stated to the committee that they had complete freedom of action in performing whatever scientific investigation they desired. Also, that they had complete freedom to interrogate any individual they considered appropriate.

Their unanimous conclusion was that the Poles were murdered at least 3 years ago—thus placing the time of death as the spring of 1940 when the Katyn area was under Soviet control.

Dr. Tramsten presented as an exhibit for the committee the original protocol signed by the 12 doctors in their own handwriting. He also presented a photograph of the 12 doctors signing the protocol to prove that there was no duress.

Dr. Orsos, Dr. Naville, and Dr. Tramsten definitely identified this protocol and stated that they had signed it and that they were of the same opinion today as they were when they signed this protocol on April 30, 1943.

Dr. Miloslavich gave the following testimony to the committee relative to the condition of the bodies as they were found in the mass graves:

"One body was placed on top of the other one, with their faces down. They were close together, nothing between them. All the bodies were dressed in Polish officers' uniforms, the clothing being winter clothing, underwear, and the uniforms; and coats on some. The heads were downward. One body like this, the next one like this, and the next one like this [indicating]. This was the width of the grave. Then 12 layers down, and then multiply by the length. I
don't remember how many we found in the length. Anyway, at that time when I was examining and making my own estimations I didn't follow anybody, and no one tried to give me any advice because I knew what to do. I estimated approximately 2,870, something like that, a little less than 3,000 officers. They were packed completely together by decaying fluids of the human body, the decomposing fluids, with started to penetrate, to imbibe, to infiltrate every dead body in there. That was a solid mass in which you just saw skulls you could recognize and that they were human beings.

"Then I went into the graves and studied which ones of them would give me the best information, what the dead body could tell us. With the help of two Russian peasants I picked a body, and slowly and gradually—it took them close to an hour—they removed the body and brought it out. I examined it very carefully to find out two main points. First, what was the cause of death. Second, how long a time was this individual buried. Third, who he was?

"In examining the body I found a gunshot wound at the boundary between the back of the neck and the head. The Germans gave the expression 'nacken schuss.' That is the precise description of the shot which was fired. The majority of them had just one shot, because it entered in here [pointing with finger] and came out here at the root of the nose, which means the head was bent downward. It was administered with such precision that the medulla was completely destroyed. (See pt. III of the published hearings.)"

Both Tramsen and Naville presented to the committee numerous papers, military buttons, officers' insignia, and, in the case of Dr. Naville, a cigarette holder, which they had taken from the Polish bodies in Katyn at the time of their own individual autopsies. Both of these doctors had preserved this material since the day they left Katyn and voluntarily offered these items to the committee. (All of this material has been made part of the permanent record and may be found as exhibits in part V of the published hearings.)

Dr. Palmieri testified as follows:

"In the bodies, at least in many of the bodies, Professor Orsos observed the presence of growths (corns)—in the inside of the cranial, pseudo growths in the internal part of the skull, which are due to manifestations of reduction of the mineralization of the brain—of the cerebral tissues and of the other substances contained in the skull."

Dr. Palmieri stated when interrogated by the committee as follows:

"Question. What conclusion did you arrive at?

"Dr. Palmieri. I came to the conclusion especially similar to Orsos' theory on the formation of cerebral growth.

"Question. Was Dr. Orsos' conclusion that the deaths occurred not later than April or May 1940?

"Dr. Palmieri. Yes.

"Question. Do you agree?

"Dr. Palmieri. Yes, based on the researches that Dr. Orsos had made (see part V of the published hearings)."

The five doctors heard by this committee stated emphatically that many of their observations were made independently and outside the presence or possible influence of German authorities who were supervising the exhumations.
Before the committee held its hearings in Europe, word was received that Drs. Markov and Hajek, who are today in countries behind the iron curtain, were giving radio talks implying that they were not in full agreement with the German International Medical Commission's protocol which they had signed on April 30, 1943.

In the published hearings of this committee—particularly parts III and V—there is contained the testimony of five international doctors. Categorical statements are made by all five doctors who testified before this committee that all members of the International Medical Commission signed the protocol of their own free will and without duress. The five doctors specifically stated that both Drs. Markov and Hajek had made no objections and were in full agreement with the protocol when they signed it.

IX. RUSSIAN REPORT

While the testimony heard by this committee is conclusive in itself to establish that the Polish officers were massacred by the Soviets, nothing appears as incriminating against the Russians as their own report published in 1944 following an investigation of Katyn by an all-Soviet commission.

The committee has made a careful analysis of the Soviet report (which is exhibit 4 in part III of the published hearings). This analysis was important because when the Soviets declined this committee's invitation to participate in the investigation, they maintained that their own report conclusively established the Germans were responsible for the Katyn massacre.

It is interesting to see how the Soviet's official findings stand up under the light of facts uncovered by this committee.

At the very outset, the Soviet claim is incongruous with the facts. The Soviets quote Russian natives who allegedly saw Polish officers working on road gangs and construction projects in the Smolensk area prior to the German invasion. These witnesses are quoted to substantiate the Soviet allegation that all the officers were transferred from Kozieisk, Starobieisk, and Ostnshkov by the Russians in March and April 1940 to three camps in the Smolensk area designated only as ON1, ON2, and ON3. If the Polish officers worked on road gangs—as the Russians maintain—it is logical to ask of their boots and uniforms would have shown as little wear as Colonel Van Vliet observed when he examined their bodies in Katyn.

While conducting hearings in London, this committee was fortunate in obtaining the testimony of Mr. Joseph Mackiewicz who visited the Katyn Forest on instructions of the Polish underground in May 1943 and observed the German exhumations. Mr. Mackiewicz is an authority on the Katyn massacre having tirelessly studied all related facts for the past 9 years. Some of his observations (starting on p. 867 of part IV) follow:

"The Russian communiqué claims that there were found at Katyn 11,000 bodies, but actually there were found only slightly more than 4,000. The Bolsheviks, therefore, used the figure 11,000, because even if assuming that those 4,000 that were found in Katyn had been murdered by the Germans, the question arises: What happened to the rest? Furthermore, the question of the corre-
spondence becomes associated here. The Russians claimed that they had found correspondence on these bodies which indicated that these men had corresponded with their families in Poland up to 1941. If there were 11,000 bodies in Katyn, each one of them then most probably had some family in Poland ranging anywhere from 1 to 6 people.

"The number of potential witnesses in Poland who could have been summoned to testify that they had corresponded with any members of their family in these camps up to and including 1941 would have reached the figure, roughly, of 20,000 to 30,000. The Germans, who had, of course, capitalized on a tremendous propaganda to their own advantage, would have taken into consideration the fact that, in a country where the people were generally adversely disposed toward the Germans, the news that the Germans had lied would have certainly spread very quickly through Poland, and the Germans would have never permitted themselves to be compromised to that extent."

Mackiewicz adds further:

"The Russian Commission claims that these Poles had been brought to the rail station at Gniedowo in the year 1940, that they were not murdered but instead placed into three camps, No. 1 ON, No. 2 ON and No. 3 ON at a distance of from 25 to 45 kilometers to the west of Smolensk, and that during the time of the German offensive they fell captive into the hands of the Germans. This, of course, is a lie, because there were no such camps in that locality. The Russian communiqué does not specify exactly where were those three camps. Naturally, if those three camps had actually existed, they could have notified Ambassador Kot, General Sikorski, General Anders, and Mr. Czapski, who had conducted a long search for these men."

The allegation made in the Russian report that the commanding officer of the three camps was unable to get transportation to evacuate the Poles from the camps while the Germans were advancing, conflicts with known facts. This committee had testimony presented in London which clearly spelled out that Russian commanders were ordered to save prisoners-of-war at all costs.

Statements taken by the committee here in Washington, from a former high Soviet official assigned to the Russian foreign office during World War II, also established that Russian prisoners of war were not to fall into enemy hands under any circumstances.

Mackiewicz's comment on this point was:

"Furthermore, the Russian communiqué or report claims that the commanding officer of the Russian camp No. 1 ON was a major of the NKGB, Wietosznikow, and that when the Germans were approaching that area the commanding officer had communicated with the commanding officer of the transport forces in Smolensk, Iwannov, with a request for rail cars in order to evacuate these Polish prisoners. Since he was unsuccessful in obtaining these railroad cars, consequently these Polish prisoners fell into the hands of the Germans, but Wietosznikow himself remained with the Russian forces and did not fall into captivity of the Germans. Therefore, if Wietosznikow, who was the commanding officer of the security forces, knew about the whereabouts of these soldiers, why did not Stalin and Molotov and Vischinsky know about their presence vir-
tually within the shadow of Moscow? And as a consequence, for 2
years they ostensibly searched to find an answer as to the where-
abouts of these soldiers. Wietosznikow certainly must have report-
ed to his superiors as to what happened to these prisoners, and
when Czapski made his frequent inquiries to the NKVD, they
would have immediately told him that these men fell captive to the
Germans.

"Assuming that Wietosznikow could not get the rail cars from
Iwannov as he had requested, he could have evacuated the soldiers
from these prison camps by foot, especially when you consider that
the claim is that Wietosznikow appealed to Iwannov for these cars
on the 12th of July; but the official Soviet communiqué of the 23d
of July 1941, claimed that the Russians were still in control and
possession of Smolensk."

The Russians further claim their Polish camps were near the
Gussino line and that trains could not be sent because that line al-
ready was under fire. If, in fact, these three camps were along the
Gussino line, which is west of Smolensk and which leads right into
Gussino, it is reasonable to ask why were these Polish prisoners re-
moved at Gniezdo, 45 miles away, after being evacuated from
their original camps, and transported by truck the rest of the way
when there are sufficient railway stops from Gniezdovo all the way
to Gussino itself.

Mackiewicz testified:

"There actually were no camps in the location that the Russians
claim that they had taken these men to, and I had substantiated
that to any satisfaction on the basis of my conversations with in-
habitants of the general area and my conversations with Kriwozer-
cow. All of them told me that there had never been any such
camps in that area. Furthermore, I would like to call your atten-
tion to one more little detail.

"The attitude in Poland and in Russia was so bitterly anti-
German in 1943 that when they released the news of Katyn, that
is, the Germans, in the spring of 1943, the announcement gave
birth to a mess of various versions of what happened, which could
have refuted the German version.

"At that time, because communications, especially radio com-
munications, had been severely curtailed, many people had not heard
the German version. As a consequence, the Russian agents, who
were very actively operating in all these parts started rumors of
their own version, merely to destroy and discredit the German ver-
sion.

"As an example, when I was in Katyn, there were with me two
Portuguese correspondents. One of these men told me that he had
been taken to look at a little village, to which the Germans had
taken him, and then he asked me repeatedly whether I felt certain
that this was the work of the Russians. I asked him, 'Why do you
ask?' He said that he had talked to a young girl in this village, who
told him that those murdered men 'are really Jews who have been
dressed in Polish uniforms.'

"Even such fantastic stories were circulated when if, in effect,
and in actuality, there were those three camps in this area, they
would have said that the Poles were in these camps and the Ger-
mans came by and captured these Poles and that they murdered
them. Nobody at all has ever heard of any such camps in that area."

In the Russian report, witness T.E. Fatkov testifies that round-ups of the Polish war prisoners took place up until September 1941. And, he goes on to say in the Russian version that, "After September 1941, the round-ups were discontinued and no one saw Polish war prisoners any more."

Thus, Fatkov fixes the last possible date of the executions at September 1941. If this is true, and it must be true, since it is in the Russian's own report, why then were all of these Polish war prisoners found in winter garb in the Katyn Forest? Weather reports show that the temperatures during August and September of 1941 in the Smolensk area ranged between 65 and 75 degrees Fahrenheit. It is inconceivable that the Polish prisoners of war would have had scarfs tied around their necks and would be wearing overcoats if they actually were massacred in August and September of 1941.

Russian witnesses further testified that they knew that the men they say were Polish war prisoners because they wore the same Polish uniforms and their characteristic four-cornered hats. This committee has photographs of Poles who reported to General Anders from other camps in 1941 when he was forming his Polish army. None of these men reported in their original Polish uniforms since they were worn out during their 2-year captivity.

The Russians claim that Witness Kisselev, who had testified before the German Commission, had been brutally beaten to say that he actually had seen and witnessed the executions. The Germans never claimed to have an "eyewitness." Any allegations which the Russians attribute to Kisselev, therefore, are false.

The Soviet report is inconsistent with the facts in its claim there were 11,000 Poles massacred at Katyn. The Polish Red Cross has definitely and conclusively established in the minds of this committee that there were no more than 4,143 bodies exhumed at Katyn, and another 110 found but not exhumed.

The Polish Red Cross had made a thorough search of the area in order to find more graves and no additional graves or bodies could be found.

Out of some 11,000 bodies which the Russians claim that they had found in Katyn, they were able to find only nine documents which showed a date later than May of 1940.

RUSSIAN REPORT CONTRADICTORY

Furthermore, the Russian report quotes a citizen, Moskovoskaya, who claims she talked to a man named Yegorov in March of 1943. He reportedly said that in April of 1943 he had been sent into the Katyn Forest by the Germans to remove all documents which were dated subsequent to May of 1940 from the bodies of the dead soldiers. It is interesting to note that her conversation was in March of 1943 and Yegorov was describing activities in which he allegedly had participated a month later, in April of 1943.

Yegorov allegedly stated that there was some 500 Russian natives from the area in all who were ordered by the Germans to remove these records. After the task was completed, according to
Yegorov, the 500 Russians were executed by the Germans. Nowhere in its report does the Soviet Commission claim that the graves of these 500 Russians ever were found.

Evidence before this committee already has substantially established that only 4,253 bodies were buried in Katyn. If the Russian claim that there were 11,000 Poles buried in that forest is to be accepted, why then didn’t the Russians recover the additional 7,000 bodies?

It is also significant to note that while not a single Russian witness mentions a date later than September 1941 as the time of the alleged massacre by the Germans, in their final report the Soviets claim “September to December” as the period of the executions.

Henry Cassidy told this committee that the correspondents taken to Katyn by the Russians pointed out this inconsistency, and he said further:

“Thereupon, the text of the Soviet Atrocities Commission report, which was to be released simultaneously with our dispatches, was held up for a couple of days, I suppose to be rewritten, and our dispatches were released when that report was finally ready, and it was then that we got our copy into the telegraph office.” (See p. 214, part II, of the published hearings.)

In all the allegations in the Soviet Commission’s report, not once do they make mention of the type of ammunition used. The type of ammunition, was manufactured in Germany by Genschow & Co. But testimony heard before this committee clearly proved that the German-made ammunition had been sent to Russia and the Baltic states for many years before World War II. Mr. Genschow, president of the Gustav Genschow & Co., as a witness before the committee in Frankfurt, testified as follows:

“Mr. GENSCHOW. * * * ‘The cartridges of the shells of this pistol ammunition carried, since the year 1933–34, the word “Geco” on the bottom of the shell, and underneath the “Geco” was “7.65.”

‘Question. Can 7.65 ammunition of the type manufactured by this firm be used in various kinds and makes of pistols?

‘Mr. GENSCHOW. ‘Yes, it could; because it was a standard type cartridge which could be used in very many different makes of pistols.’

‘Question. Was it used internationally by various nations, police, or armed forces, in pistols?’

‘Mr. GENSCHOW. ‘Yes certainly.’

‘Question. Did this firm ever export pistol ammunition of the caliber 7.65 to Eastern Europe?’

‘Mr. GENSCHOW. ‘Yes; that is the case.’”

(See part V of the published hearings.) From the foregoing testimony it is evident that both Russia and Germany had access to this type of ammunition.

Finally, this committee cannot accept the Russian claim that these Polish officers fell into German hands during the Soviet retreat because there isn’t an iota of proof in the Soviet report that any Russian soldiers or officers guarding these alleged camps had fallen captive to the Germans. It is inconceivable that these 15,000 Polish officers would have waited around these three camps to be taken prisoners by the Germans while their Russian guards themselves fled the impending German onslaught. These should be no
doubt that the moment the Russian soldiers abandoned the camps the 15,000 Poles likewise would have fled for freedom.

X. NUREMBERG

This committee reports that during the International Military Trials held in Nuremberg after World War II, evidence was heard relative to the Katyn massacre.

The committee has heard testimony from two of the attorneys who participated in the Nuremberg trials. (See pt. V of the published hearings.) In accordance with the London agreement of 1945, the Soviets were in charge of war crimes which were allegedly committed in the eastern areas, such as: U.S.S.R., Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Hence the Katyn massacre, since it occurred in Russian territory, was the direct responsibility of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to prosecute the individuals responsible for this crime.

The Katyn massacre appears in the Nuremberg trials as a charge against Hermann Goering since he was the highest ranking German officer. The Soviet prosecutor produced three witnesses to establish the German guilt for the Katyn massacre. The German defense counsel produced three witnesses for the defense. These were all the witnesses the tribunal would hear. Witnesses for both the Germans and the Soviets were duly examined and cross-examined.

This committee in the course of the hearings at Frankfurt heard testimony from the three German witnesses who appeared at Nuremberg, that is, Colonel Ahrens, General Oberhaeuser, and Lieutenant Von Eichborn. (See pt. V of the published hearings.)

These three witnesses testified that they were with German Signal Regiment 537, not the Five hundred and thirty-seventh Engineer Battalion as alleged in the Russian report. (See p. 247, pt. II of the published hearings.)

SOVIETS FAIL TO PROVE CASE AT NUREMBERG

All of them arrived in the Smolensk area after September 1, 1941. In the case of Colonel Ahrens, he testified that he did not arrive in the Katyn Forest until early November 1941. He was specifically named in the Russian report as the individual who directed the mass shootings of the Polish prisoners. (See p. 247, pt. III of the published hearings.) Colonel Ahrens was again accused before the International Military Tribunal by the Soviet prosecutor and it is significant to note that he was never indicted by the tribunal nor was his indictment requested by the Soviet prosecutor. (See pt. V of the published hearings.)

This committee heard testimony from Col. Albert Bedenck who was the predecessor to Colonel Ahrens as commanding officer of Signal Regiment 537. He testified that he arrived in the Smolensk area on July 28, 1941, several days after the fighting front had moved many miles east of Smolensk on the way to Moscow. Colonel Bedenck set up the headquarters of Signal Regiment 537 in the Dueiper Castle about the middle of August 1941. He testified: "the total strength of the regiment at that time was 17 of which 5 or 6 were officers, 4 were noncommissioned, and the rest were enlisted men." (See pt. V of the published hearings.)
The Russian report states, "The Polish prisoners of war who were in the three camps west of Smolensk employed on road building up to outbreak of war, remained there after the German invaders reached Smolensk, until September 1941." (See p. 247, pt. III of the published hearings.) Colonel Bedenk categorically denied ever seeing a Pole in the area, as did General Oberhaeuser and Colonel Ahrens. Colonel Bedenk also testified that Colonel Ahrens relieved him as commanding officer of Signal Regiment 537 on November 20, 1941, as did General Oberhaeuser. (See pt. V of the published hearings.) Thus the testimony taken before this committee under oath speaks for itself.

The Soviet prosecutor in his summation of the charges against Goering never mentioned the Katyn massacre. Testimony before this committee reveals that the Soviet prosecutor failed to prove his case against the Germans, therefore the matter was dropped by the tribunal.

XI. CONCLUSIONS

This committee unanimously finds, beyond any question of reasonable doubt, that the Soviet NKVD (Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs) committed the mass murders of the Polish officers and intellectual leaders in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia.

The evidence, testimony, records, and exhibits recorded by this committee through its investigations and hearings during the last 9 months, overwhelmingly will show the people of the world that Russia is directly responsible for the Katyn massacre. Throughout our entire proceedings, there has not been a scintilla of proof or even any remote circumstantial evidence presented that could indict any other nation in this international crime.

It is an established fact that approximately 15,000 Polish prisoners were interned in three Soviet camps: Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov in the winter of 1939-40. With the exception of 400 prisoners, these men have not been heard from, seen, or found since the spring of 1940. Following the discovery of the graves in 1943, when the Germans occupied this territory, they claimed there were 11,000 Poles buried in Katyn. The Russians recovered the territory from the Germans in September 1943 and likewise they stated that 11,000 Poles were buried in those mass graves.

Evidence heard by this committee repeatedly points to the certainty that only those prisoners interned at Kozielsk were massacred in the Katyn Forest. Testimony of the Polish Red Cross officials definitely established that 4,413 bodies were actually exhumed from the seven mass graves. On the basis of further evidence, we are equally certain that the rest of the 15,000 Polish officers—those interned at Starobielsk and Ostashkov—were executed in a similar brutal manner. Those from Starobielsk were disposed of near Khar-kov, and those from Ostashkov met a similar fate. Testimony was presented by several witnesses that the Ostashkov prisoners were placed on barges and drowned in the White Sea. Thus the committee believes that there are at least two other "Katyns" in Russia.

No one could entertain any doubt of Russia guilt for the Katyn massacre when the following evidence considered:
1. The Russians refused to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to make a neutral investigation of the German charges in 1943.

2. The Russians failed to invite any neutral observers to participate in their own investigation in 1944, except a group of newspaper correspondents taken to Katyn who agreed “the whole show was staged” by the Soviets.

3. The Russians failed to produce sufficient evidence a Nuremberg—even guilt for Katyn by the International Military Tribunal.

4. This committee issued formal and public invitations to the Government of the U.S.S.R. to present any evidence pertaining to the Katyn massacre. The Soviets refused to participate in any phase of this commission’s investigation.

5. The overwhelming testimony of prisoners formerly interned at the three camps, of medical experts who performed autopsies of the massacred bodies, and of observers taken to the scene of the crime conclusively confirms this committee’s findings.

6. Polish Government leaders and military men who conferred with Stalin Molotov, and NKVD chief Beria for a year and a half attempted without success to locate the Polish prisoners before the Germans discovered Katyn. This renders further proof that the Soviets purposely misled the Poles in denying any knowledge of the whereabouts of their officers when, in fact, the Poles already were buried in the mass graves at Katyn.

7. The Soviets have demonstrated through their highly organized propaganda machinery that they fear to have the people behind the iron curtain know the truth about Katyn. This is proven by their reaction to our committee’s efforts and the amount of newspaper space and radio time devoted to denouncing the work of our committee. They also republished in all newspapers behind the iron curtain the allegedly “neutral” Russian report of 1944. The world-wide campaign of slander by the Soviets against our committee is also construed as another effort to block this investigation.

8. This committee believes that one of the reasons for the staging of the recent Soviet “germ warfare” propaganda campaign was to divert attention of the people behind the iron curtain from the hearings of the committee.

9. Our committee has been petitioned to investigate mass executions and crimes against humanity committed in other countries behind the iron curtain. The committee has heard testimony which indicates there are other “Katyns.” We wish to impress with all the means at our command that the investigation of the Katyn massacre barely scratches the surface of numerous crimes against humanity perpetrated by totalitarian powers. This committee believes that an international tribunal should be established to investigate willful and mass executions wherever they have been committed. The United Nations will fail in their obligation until they expose to the world that “Katynism” is a definite and diabolical totalitarian plan for world conquest.